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1   Introduction 
 
Private life-annuity markets are frequently recognized as being weak. That is, less life-
annuities are demanded than one could expect, given the need to insure against 
uncertainty about the duration of life, in order to smooth consumption appropriately 
over one's lifetime. Empirical evidence for this fact, which is sometimes called the 
"annuity puzzle", has been established in various studies for the US (see, e.g., MOORE 
AND MITCHELL [2000], FRIEDMAN AND WARSHAWSKY [1990]), but also for the U.K., 
Canada and other countries (for an overview see BROWN [2001]). 
 
To the extent that the low demand is explained by a bequest motive or by the existence 
of a public pension system, the weakness is not attributed to an intrinsic problem of this 
market. However, there is a further reason put forward in the literature, namely 
asymmetric information which leads to adverse selection: The fact that individuals have 
more information about their life expectancy than annuity companies leads to an over-
representation of persons with a high survival probability among the buyers of annuity 
contracts, which in turn drives down the rate of return on annuities below the rate 
corresponding to the average probability of survival.
1 As a consequence of this 
phenomenon, a loss of welfare arises for persons who cannot buy an appropriate annuity 
contract. This shortcoming of the annuity market is supposed to become increasingly 
important, because in many countries the existing public pension system, organized 
                                                  
1 Empirical evidence suggests that none of these three reasons alone, but only the interaction of 
adverse selection, public pension system and bequest motives can explain the weakness of the market. 
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN AND WARSHAWSKY [1988, 1990], WALLISER [2000], MITCHELL ET AL. [1999].   2
according to the pay-as-you-go method, is expected to allow only a reduced 
replacement-ratio in the future, hence increased private insurance will be required. 
 
In the present paper we focus on the fact that annuity contracts provide periodic payouts 
for the duration of the annuitants' life (or at least for a fixed number of years). We point 
out a further consequence of the asymmetric information problem, in addition to the 
adverse-selection problem described so far: The time structure of the payoffs matters. 
Individuals with low life expectancy will put less weight on the payment they may not 
receive in the last period of life than individuals with high life expectancy do. This fact 
can be used by firms to offer annuity contracts which are favourable for low-risk 
individuals but not for high-risk individuals. 
 
Indeed, in two recent empirical papers, FINKELSTEIN AND POTERBA [2002, 2004] have 
found evidence for such selection effects in the U.K. annuities market. They analyzed 
three types of annuity contracts, which differ in the time-path of payoffs: constant 
nominal payoffs, annually escalating nominal payoffs and inflation-indexed payoffs. 
They showed that for the latter two contracts the expected present value of the payoffs, 
based on the average population mortality, is significantly lower than that for fixed 
nominal annuities. This result suggests that those two contracts, which provide the 
higher payoffs in later years, are selected by individuals with a high life-expectancy: 
Only these individuals have an incentive to buy such contracts, because for them the 
expected present value of the payoffs, based on their low mortality rates, is higher and 
may exceed that of annuities with decreasing real (i.e. fixed nominal) payoffs; the latter   3
are favourable for individuals with lower life-expectancy.
2 In fact, estimating a hazard 
model regarding the annuitants' life-spans, FINKELSTEIN AND POTERBA [2004] found 
clear evidence for such an annuitant self-selection with respect to the time profile of 
payoffs. Moreover, the selection effects turned out to be quite large.  
 
In the present contribution we provide a theoretical analysis of the functioning of 
annuity markets, when selection through the timing of payoffs takes place. In particular, 
we investigate the reaction of insurance demand and the consequences for the existence 
of equilibria, if insurers offer contracts which vary with respect to the time-path of the 
payoffs.   
 
In the model usually employed for the analysis of annuity markets (see PAULY [1974], 
ABEL [1986] and WALLISER [2000]), there is one period of retirement, and there are two 
groups of individuals with differing life expectancy. Competition takes place via prices 
(i.e. via the rate of return, that is the pension payment per unit of annuity), which are 
fixed by the firms. Individuals can buy as many annuities as they want. As is well-
known, in this framework only a pooling equilibrium is possible, where all individuals 
receive the same rate of return. 
 
We extend this model by introducing two periods of retirement, to which the individuals 
may or may not survive, and by assuming that the payoffs need not be the same in both 
                                                  
2 The lower expected present discounted value of the real annuity, based on average mortality, may 
partly also arise, because a premium for the insurance against inflation has to be paid. The market for real 
annuities is analyzed in BROWN, MITCHELL AND POTERBA [2001], who study the role of government-
issued inflation indexed bonds and other securities as instruments, which insurance companies use to 
hedge price level risks (primarily in the UK and US). However, the authors do not consider selection 
effects.   4
periods. This implies that contracts are characterized by two prices, set by the firms. 
The important aspect in this extended model is that - in accordance with the observation 
mentioned above - annuity demand as well as welfare of the individuals are sensitive 
with respect to the time structure of the payoffs, and the possibility arises for firms to 
separate buyers according to their survival probabilities.  This additional separation 
effect, which was up to now neglected in the theoretical literature, may represent a 
further explanation for the fact that annuity markets are not well developed. Indeed, it 
turns out that in such a market no Nash-Cournot equilibrium may exist. If one exists, it 
will be a separating equilibrium. 
 
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium in insurance markets was studied by ROTHSCHILD AND 
STIGLITZ [1976]. In their framework firms offer a number of different contracts which 
specify both a price and a quantity. Individuals who prefer a higher quantity are willing 
to pay a higher price for it. A prerequisite for the existence of price and quantity 
competition is that individuals can buy at most one contract, which may be a reasonable 
assumption for some insurance markets, e.g. insurance against accidents, but seems 
difficult to apply to the annuity market.
3 Consequently, in our model individuals are free 
to buy as many annuities as they want. Separation becomes possible because firms can 
fix two prices instead of a price and a quantity. 
 
As a potential answer to the question of what happens in an insurance market, if no 
Nash-Cournot-equilibrium exists, WILSON [1977] introduced a different equilibrium 
                                                  
3   ECKSTEIN, EICHENBAUM AND PELED [1985] make indeed the assumption of a price and quantity 
competition for the annuity market with one period of retirement only. In this framework they derive the 
same results as ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1976].   5
concept, which is based on specific beliefs of firms concerning the reaction of other 
firms to new contract offers. We show that a Wilson equilibrium always exists in our 
model.  
 
Other studies which quit the assumption of a single period of retirement are by 
TOWNLEY AND BOADWAY [1988] and FELDSTEIN [1990]. Feldstein considers a public 
pension system, organized according to the pay-as-you-go method, and discusses the 
time structure of the benefits. He assumes two periods of retirement, but only survival 
to the second is uncertain. In this framework current population prefers to receive 
benefits either in the first or in the second period of retirement, depending on whether 
the return on social security is lower or higher than the expected return on private 
saving. However, steady-state welfare is maximized by paying benefits only in the first 
retirement period, since this increases savings and therefore unintended bequests.  
 
The paper by TOWNLEY AND BOADWAY [1988] deals with the market for private 
annuities and is, thus, more related to the present contribution. The authors model the 
life-span from retirement to death in continuous time and consider term-insured annuity 
contracts, i.e. contracts which guarantee a stream of payoffs for a limited time, either 
until the insured individual dies or until the term of the annuity expires. In their analysis 
of equilibria, Townley and Boadway take the stream of payoffs as constant over the 
whole duration; hence the contracts are characterized by two parameters: the term 
(duration) and the payoff (per unit of money invested). In contrast to our model, where 
firms can separate costumers through a variation of the payment over time, Townley 
and Boadway study separation effects with respect to the term of the annuity:   6
Individuals with longer expected life-span estimate a contract with a longer duration 
higher than individuals with shorter expected life-span. In the framework of their 
model, with asymmetric information concerning life-expectancy, no equilibrium may 
exist, if it exists, it is either a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium.  
 
In TOWNLEY AND BOADWAY [1988] individuals can make provision for the time after 
expiry of the annuity through private savings only. In a related study (BRUNNER AND 
PECH [2002]), we have considered a model which also takes the existence of time-
limited annuity contracts into account, but allows individuals to provide for the time 
after expiry of the annuity by purchasing another annuity. That is, individuals need not 
make their decision concerning old-age provision for the whole time of retirement at 
once, but can do so sequentially. In this framework it turns out that only a situation, 
where all individuals decide sequentially, represents an equilibrium, which is to the 
disadvantage of the short-living individuals. 
 
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the basic model of 
consumption behaviour under asymmetric information with two periods of retirement, 
where individuals provide for old-age by buying annuities. We analyze the effect of a 
variation in the time structure of the payoffs on annuity demand and on welfare of an 
individual under uncertain lifetime. In Section 3 we turn to the investigation of 
equilibria. First, we derive all results concerning the existence and characterization of 
the equilibria in the basic model. Then we extend the model and allow individuals to 
save in riskless bonds in addition to annuities. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. 
   7
2   Annuity demand in a model with two periods of retirement 
 
2.1 The basic model with asymmetric information 
 
Consider an economy with N individuals who live for a maximum of three periods 
t = 0,1,2. In the working period t = 0 individual i earns a fixed labour income w, spends 
an amount A
i on annuities and consumes an amount  i
o c . This gives the budget equation 
for period 0: 
 
(1)  0
ii cw A =−.    
 
The individuals retire at the end of period 0. Through the purchase of annuities they 
make provision for future consumption in the two periods of retirement t = 1,2. An 
annuity contract is characterized by the payoffs (q1,q2): An annuity A
i = 1 pays qt units 
of money to the individual in the retirement periods t = 1,2, if she survives. Hence, for 
individual i the budget equations for the two retirement periods are 
 
(2)  11
ii cq A = ,  
(3)  22
ii cq A = .  
 
The budget equations (1) – (3) are built on the assumption that the individuals do not 
save and buy other assets, in addition to annuities. At this stage of the analysis we 
exclude holding other assets, in order to concentrate on the design of the annuity   8
contracts. However, the possibility of buying bonds in the working period and in the 
first period of retirement is explicitly considered in Section 3.4, and it will be shown 
that this does not change the main results derived in the basic model. Further, for the 
sake of simplicity, the assumption is made that no public pension system exists.
4 
 
Survival to period t = 1 is uncertain and occurs with probability  1
i π ,  1 01 <<
i π . In the 
same way, given that an individual is alive in period 1, survival to period 2 occurs with 
probability  2
i π ,  2 01 <<
i π . Each individual decides on her consumption plan over the 
uncertain duration of her retirement by maximizing expected utility from a time-
separable utility function  i U , 
 
(4)   ( ) ( )
2
101 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ii i i i ii i i ii i U u c u cu c u cu c u c ππ π α π πα α =− + − + + + + ,  
 
subject to conditions (1), (2) and (3). In (4)  ( )
i
t uc  describes utility of consumption per 
period, where we assume that  ( ) 0
i
t uc ′ > , ( ) 0
i
t uc ′′ <  and 
0 lim ( )
→ ′ = ∞
c uc . α denotes the 
one-period discount factor of utility, with 01 α < ≤ . Notice that the specification in (4) 
means that the individuals discount future consumption for two reasons, risk aversion 




0111 2 2 () () () =+ +
ii i i i ii Uu c u c u c πα ππα . 
  
                                                  
4   In Section 4 we discuss the consequences for our results, if a public pension system is introduced 
in the model.    9
Inserting (1), (2) and (3) into (4’) and differentiating with respect to A
i yields the first 




01 1 11 2 2 2 '( ) '( ) '( ) 0 −+ + =
ii ii i i uc q uc q uc πα ππα .  
 
From (2) and (3) we know that  1
i c  <
> _  2
i c  corresponds to q1 <
> _ q2. Let A
i(q1,q2) be the 
annuity demand determined by (5), for given (q1,q2). 
 
From now on we assume that the otherwise identical individuals are divided into two 
groups  i = L,H, characterized by different risks of a long life, i.e. by different 
probabilities of survival 
H L
tt π π >  for t = 1,2. Let γ and (1 − γ) denote the share of the 
high-risk and low-risk individuals, resp., with 0 < γ < 1. The probabilities  i
t π  and the 
share γ are public information, known by the annuity companies. But it is the private 
information for each individual to know her type, i.e. her probability of survival. As a 
consequence, there is an adverse-selection problem in the annuity market. This is 
illustrated by the following lemma, which shows that high-risk individuals buy more 
annuities than low-risk individuals, given any contract (q1,q2).  
 
Lemma 1: For any contract (q1,q2) an individual with high survival probabilities will 






                                                  
5 The proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions are relegated to the Appendix A.1.    10
This result implies that if there is only a single contract offered in the annuity market, 
with some given payoffs (q1,q2) per period, then the share of annuity purchases of high-
risk individuals in total annuity demand is larger than γ, which is the share of high-risk 
individuals in the economy.  
 
2.2 Separating and pooling contracts 
 
An annuity contract  12 (,)
ii qq  is said to be individually fair for an individual of type 
i = L,H, if expected payoffs equal the price, i.e. if it fulfills 
 
(6)  11 1 22 10
ii iii qq ππ π − −= ,     
 
given the assumption of a zero interest rate, which is chosen for the sake of simplicity; a 
positive interest rate would not affect the qualitative results. Obviously, (6) implies that 
the annuity companies make zero expected profits, given that solely individuals of type 
i buy their individually fair contracts. However, as there exist many contracts  12 (,)
ii qq  
which fulfill (6), it is interesting to investigate which of the individually fair annuity 
contracts is the most preferred one by an individual of type i. The next Lemma provides 
a characterization.  
 
Lemma 2: Among all individually fair contracts  12 (,)
ii qq  for an individual of type i, the 
most preferred is characterized by  
   11
(7)  12 '( ) '( )
ii uc uc α = , 
 
which implies that  12
ii qq > , if α < 1 and  12
ii qq = , if α = 1. 
 
That is, in case of a zero rate of time preference (α = 1), an equal distribution of the 
payoffs  12 (/ 1 ) =
ii qq  over the two periods of retirement is optimal, for both types 
,, iL H =  given their respective individually fair contract. For α < 1, however, the 
optimum ratio  12 /( 1 ) >
ii qq , determined by (7), will in general be different for the two 
types, because in this case the optimum ratio depends on the respective annuity demand 
A
L and A
H, which will be different. (But one checks easily that the most preferred ratio 
12 /
ii qq  is independent of A
i and thus identical for both types, in case of a per-period 
utility function u which exhibits a constant relative risk aversion, irrespective of the rate 
of time preference.) 
 
Note, moreover, that with the most preferred individually fair contract the relation (7), 
which characterizes the optimum division of consumption between the two periods of 
retirement, also applies for the allocation decision between consumption in the working 
period and the first period of retirement, namely 
 
(8)  01 '( ) '( ) =
ii uc uc α .  
 
This can be seen when eliminating  2 '( )
i uc  in (5) by use of (7), which yields 
01 1 1 1 2 2 '( ) '( )( ) =+
ii i i i i i uc uc q q απ π π . Substituting (6) into this condition, it reduces to (8). It   12
follows that an individual, who does not discount future consumption due to time 
preference (α =  1), consumes the same amount in all three periods of life, i.e. 
012 ==
iii ccc . Otherwise (α < 1), she chooses  012 >>




tt π π < , t = 1,2, implies that individual fairness (condition (6)) for 
each group can be fulfilled only with two separate contracts. If each is bought by the 
respective risk group, both produce zero profits. On the other hand, a contract (q1,q2) 
which is bought by both groups, is called a pooling contract. In order that a pooling 





(9)  11 21 2 11 21 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0
LL L L HH H H Aq q Aq q γπ π π γ π π π − −− + −− = . 
 
Zero-profit contracts (whether separate or pooling) are of special interest, because under 
the assumption of perfect competition in the annuity market, only such contracts can 
persist. (9) can also be written as 
 
(9')  ( ) ( ) 12 1 1 121 2 12 1212 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0
LH L LH H qq q qq q qq ρ π ρπ π π ρπ π + −+ − + = , 
 
where ρ is defined by  ( ) ( ) 12 12 12 ( ,) ( ,) ( 1 )( ,)
HL qq A qq Aqq ργ γ ≡− , that is the ratio of 
annuity demand of both groups. Note that ρ depends on (q1,q2), but for shortness, we 
usually do not indicate this dependency. Of course, our assumptions on the survival 
probabilities imply that for the low-risk individuals expected returns from a zero-profit   13
pooling contract are lower than required for individual fairness ( 11 21 2 10
LL L qq ππ π − −> ), 
while for the high-risk individuals they are higher ( 11 21 2 10
HH H qq ππ π − −< ). 
 
2.3 Varying the payoff-ratio of a pooling contract 
 
In the Lemmas 3 and 4 below, we consider a zero-profit pooling contract and 
investigate the effect of a marginal change in the payoffs on indirect utility and on 
annuity demand of an individual of type i = L,H. Clearly, if q1 (or q2) is increased alone, 
then both groups benefit and buy more annuities. However, such an increase would 
produce a loss for the annuity companies. Hence, the interesting case is when q1 is 
increased at the expense of q2 (or vice versa), such that the zero-profit condition (9) 
remains fulfilled. We characterize the first-round effect on indirect utility and on 
annuity demand of a marginal increase of q1, when the associated change of q2, such 
that (9') remains fulfilled, is calculated under the assumption of a constant ratio ρ of 
annuity demand of the two groups. Moreover we discuss the conditions necessary for 
the second-round effects (i.e. the influence of the payoffs on ρ) not to outweigh the 
first-round effects.  
 
In Lemma 3(i) we consider a contract with a ratio of the payoffs, which is optimal for an 
individual of type L according to condition (7) for an individually fair contract. We 
show that this ratio is no longer optimal in case of a zero-profit pooling contract: The 
low-risk individual benefits, if q1 is increased. An analogous result is found for a high-
risk individual (Lemma 3(ii)): She benefits if q1 is reduced.  
   14
Lemma 3: Consider two pooling contracts  12 (, ) qq ′ ′ ,  12 (, ) qq ′′′ ′  where each, together with 
annuity demand of the two groups, fulfills the zero-profit condition (9').  
(i)  If the payoff ratio  12 qq ′′  satisfies the condition (7) for an optimal individually fair 
contract for type L, a marginal increase of q1 (and thus a marginal decrease of q2) 
where (9') for fixed ρ remains fulfilled, makes an individual of type L better off.  
(ii) If the payoff ratio  12 qq ′′ ′′  satisfies the condition (7) for an optimal individually fair 
contract for type H, a marginal increase of q1 (and thus a marginal decrease of q2) 
where (9') for fixed ρ remains fulfilled, makes an individual of type H worse off. 
 
This first-round effect described in Lemma 3 is of particular interest, because it reveals 
the mechanism which is responsible for the negative result concerning the existence of a 
pooling contract in equilibrium (see Section 3.1). For an illustration, consider the case 
α = 1, which means – as we know from Lemma 2 - that both individuals prefer an equal 
distribution of the payoffs over the two periods of retirement, given their respective 
individually fair contract. However, in case of a zero-profit pooling contract, such an 
equal distribution of the payoffs is no longer optimal: Individuals with low life-
expectancy are better off, if q1, the payoff in the first period of retirement, is increased 
at the expense of q2, while the opposite holds for individuals with high life-expectancy. 
Thus, the annuity companies have an incentive to design separate contracts for the two 
groups. 
 
The intuitive reason why a low-risk individual finds a shift of consumption from period 
2 to period 1 attractive can easily be explained for α = 1 (and thus starting from q1 = q2)   15
as follows: If q1 is increased by one, q2 is decreased by  21 / dq dq , which is determined 
by the requirement that the zero-profit condition (9') be preserved. Since with a pooling 
contract the associated decrease of q2 goes more to the expense of the high-risk 
individuals, it turns out from (9') that  21 / dq dq  < 1/ 2
L π  (for constant ρ). As a result, for 
type-L individuals the expected loss in period 2,  2
L π 21 / dq dq , is lower than one and 
they benefit from a shift towards increasing q1. (Note that due to q1 = q2, marginal utility 
is equal in both periods.) By the same reasoning and observing that, on the other hand, 
21 2 /1 / >
H dq dq π  holds, type-H individuals, who expect to live longer, are better off by 
a shift towards reducing q1. Similar considerations apply for the case of α < 1.  
 
Obviously also the second-round effect, that is the effect  t q ρ ∂ ∂  of the change of the 
payoffs on (the ratio of) annuity demand of the two groups, matters, as can be seen from 
(A6) in the Appendix. The above consideration certainly maintains, if both  t q ρ ∂∂, 
t =  1,2, are sufficiently small, otherwise an appropriate relation between them must 
hold. (For instance, a sufficient, but not necessary condition is 
21 2 2 1
HL qq q πρ ρ πρ ∂∂≥ ∂∂≥∂∂, which ensures that the second-round effect goes into 
the same direction as the first-round effect.) 
 
Remark: Inspection of the proof of the foregoing Lemma shows that an increase of q1 at 
the expense of q2 improves welfare of low-risk individuals also if initially the ratio 
12 / qq  is lower than that determined by the optimality condition (7) for individually fair 
contracts. It follows that their most preferred pooling contract exhibits a higher ratio 
(that is, in case of  1: α =  q1 > q2). By similar reasoning one finds for the high-risk   16
individuals that their most preferred pooling contract exhibits a lower payoff-ratio than 
that determined by (7) (which means q1 < q2 in case of  1 α = ). 
 
A characterization of the effect of a marginal change of q1 (and q2) on annuity demand 
is given in the following Lemma, again starting from a zero-profit pooling contract with 
a payoff-ratio which satisfies (7) for the respective optimal individually fair contract. 
We restrict attention to the case where the discount factor α equals one or the per-period 
utility function exhibits a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion in the sense of 
Arrow-Pratt, defined as  () ()
ii i
tt t R cu c u c ′′′ ≡− . Then, as mentioned above, the optimal 
payoff-ratio, given an individually fair contract, is the same for both risk-types (and 
equal to 1, if  1 α = ). 
 
Lemma 4: Assume that α = 1 or that R is constant. Consider a pooling contract  12 (, ) qq ′′  
which, together with annuity demand of the two groups, fulfills the zero-profit condition 
(9') and whose payoff ratio  12 qq ′′ is determined by the condition (7) for an optimal 
individually fair contract for both types i = L,H. Then the effect of a marginal increase 
of q1 on the annuity demand of each individual i = L,H, where (9') for fixed ρ remains 
fulfilled, depends on the relative risk aversion in the following way: 
 
 Iff  R <
>










> _ 0.   
 
This result follows from the fact that, per definition, the effect of an increase of q1 on 
q1u'(q1A
i), i.e. on the marginal utility of A
i in period 1, can be written as (1 – R), and the   17
same applies to period 2. Hence, whether an increase of q1 at the expense of q2 increases 
or decreases expected  marginal utility of A
i (in both retirement periods together) 
depends on  22 1 (1 / )
idq dq π + (1 − R), where, as argued above,  22 1 /
idq dq π  describes the 
expected loss in period 2, if q1 is increased and the zero-profit condition is preserved. 
(Note that, by assumption, either q1 = q2 which means that R is equal in both periods, or 
R is constant at all.) We know from above that  22 1 1/
idq dq π +  is positive for i = L and 
negative for i = H, given a fixed ratio ρ of annuity demand of both groups. Thus we find 
that, in case of R < 1, for type-L individuals the expected marginal utility of A
L in the 
two periods of retirement increases, if q1 is increased at the expense of q2. On the other 
hand, the decision on annuity demand is made by balancing the (negative) marginal 
utility of A
L in the working period against the expected (positive) marginal utility in 
retirement. It is intuitively clear that demand increases, if the latter increases (the former 
is unaffected by a change of q1 and q2). Moreover, in case of R > 1, the effect obviously 
goes towards a decrease of A
L, and similar consideration hold for type-H individuals.  
 
3   Equilibria 
 
Introducing two instead of one retirement period in the model allows annuity companies 
to offer contracts which differ in the division of the payoffs over time. In this section it 
is shown that this implies the possibility of a separating equilibrium, which means that 
annuity companies separate individuals according to their survival probabilities. To 
obtain this result we make use of the well-known concept of a Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium, which was studied by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1976] in the context of 
insurance markets. Our result is in contrast to studies considering one period of   18
retirement only, which find that under price competition there will be a pooling 
equilibrium. In Subsection 3.3 we extend the analysis by introducing the concept of the 
WILSON [1977] equilibrium, where it is assumed that firms anticipate reactions of the 
other firms to new contract offers, viz. that they will withdraw unprofitable existing 
contracts. First we derive all results concerning the existence and characterization of 
equilibria in the model considered in Section 2, where individuals provide for retirement 
by buying annuities only, then we introduce, in Section 3.4, the possibility of saving in 
riskless bonds. 
 
3.1 The non-existence of a pooling equilibrium 
 
We call a contract (q1,q2) a pooling equilibrium, if together with A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H, the 
zero-profit condition (9) is fulfilled and if no other contract exists, which is preferred to 
(q1,q2) by at least one group i ∈ {L,H} and which allows a nonnegative profit. Our main 
result is that in general no pooling equilibrium exists. As a preparation we show:  
 
Lemma 5: Let (q1,q2) be a pooling contract which together with A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H, 
fulfills the zero-profit condition (9). Any contract ( 11 22 , qq qq δ δ + + ), which is close 
enough to (q1,q2) and which is chosen only by group L (i.e. A
H =  0) allows a 
nonnegative profit. 
 
This result follows from the observation in Section 2.2 that a zero-profit pooling 
contract offers less expected returns to low-risk individuals than required for individual   19
fairness. This in turn implies positive profits, if only the low-risk individuals buy this 
contract or one close to it.  
 
We now introduce a further assumption on U
i, in addition to strict concavity of the 
instantaneous utility function u. Let indirect utility U
i(q1,q2) for any contract (q1,q2) be 
defined in the usual way as utility attained with annuity demand A
i(q1,q2). We assume 












  for all (q1,q2).    
 
This condition, which is familiar from other models with asymmetric information, 
requires that the slope of an indifference curve of a low-risk individual is always steeper 
than that of a high-risk individual. Hence, indifference curves of the two groups can 







H)), and one observes that, as  22
LH π π < , 
the condition is certainly fulfilled for any utility function which exhibits a constant 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, hence, in particular, for logarithmic utility. Single-
crossing is needed for a concise formulation of the following Proposition 1 only; in the 
remark afterwards it will be argued that in general the Proposition holds without this 
assumption.  
 
Proposition 1: No pooling equilibrium exists, given the single-crossing condition (10). 
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This result can be illustrated in a diagram where the payoffs q1 and q2 are drawn on the 
axis (see Figure 1). The dashed line ZP denotes the zero-profit condition (9) for a 
pooling contract, with slope  21 dq dq , as determined by (A6) in the Appendix. Consider 
any contract (q1,q2) fulfilling (9), i.e. any point on ZP. Due to the single-crossing 
condition the slope of the indifference curve U
L corresponding to the low-risk group is 
steeper than that of U
H, the indifference curve of the high-risk group. Therefore one can 
find a contract (q1+ 12 2 , qq q δ δ + ), close to (q1,q2), which is preferred by the low-risk 
individuals only - and is, therefore, profitable for the annuity companies, as Lemma 5 
tells us. Hence (q1,q2) does not represent a pooling equilibrium.  
 
Figure 1  






















Remark: By means of Figure 1 the significance of the single-crossing condition can be 
discussed. One observes immediately that the result of Proposition 1 certainly holds as   21
long as the slopes of U
L and U
H differ in (q1,q2)-space, independently of which one is 
steeper. Even if U
L and U
H have the same slope, the result holds, given that the slope of 
ZP is different. In this case one can find another pooling contract ( 11 22 , qq qq δ δ ++ ) 
close to (q1,q2) which is preferred by both groups and produces non-negative profits. 
Only if there exists a point on ZP in which the slopes of ZP, U
L and U
H are identical, 
this represents a pooling equilibrium. Clearly, this case can occur for very specific 
parameter constellations only, a small perturbation of γ or of 
i
t π  would destroy the 
equilibrium. From these considerations we can conclude that in general Proposition 1 
holds without assuming the single-crossing condition. 
 
3.2 The possibility of a separating equilibrium 
 
We call a set of two contracts ( 12 ,
LL qq ), ( 12 ,
H H qq ) a separating equilibrium, if each 
fulfills the respective zero-profit condition (6), if group L does not prefer ( 12 ,
H H qq ) to 
( 12 ,
LL qq ) and vice versa, i.e. if  
 
(11)  12 1 2 (,) (,)
H HH HLL Uqq Uq q ≥ ,  
(12)  12 1 2 (,) (, )
LLL LHH Uqq Uqq ≥ ,  
 
and if no other contract exists, which is preferred to ( 12 ,
ii qq) by at least one group 
i ∈ {L,H} and which allows a nonnegative profit. 
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As it is usual in this type of asymmetric-information models, we assume that if an 
individual is indifferent between the two contracts ( 12 ,
LL qq ) and ( 12 ,
H H qq ), she chooses 
indeed the particular contract which is designed for her. Moreover, each individual is 
restricted to buy only one type of contract, i.e. no mix of ( 12 ,
LL qq ) and ( 12 ,
H H qq ).
6 
However, individuals may purchase as many annuity contracts of the chosen type as 
they want. 
 
We show that with these assumptions a separating equilibrium may, but need not exist, 
by referring to the logarithmic utility function. For simplicity we assume that the 
discount factor α equals one, then lifetime utility (4') for an individual i = L,H reads  
 
(13)  01 11 22 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) =+ +
ii i i i i i Uc c c ππ π .  
 
(13) has two convenient properties: (i) As mentioned above, the single-crossing 
condition (10) is fulfilled, since at any (q1,q2) the slope of the indifference curve, which 
is  22 1 /( )
i qq π − , is flatter for a type-H individual than for a type-L individual. (ii) Annuity 
demand of any individual i = L,H does not depend on the payoffs, since the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion R is equal to one (see Lemma 4 and (A24) in Appendix A.3). 
These properties help to keep the analytical and graphical analysis simple.  
 
                                                  
6   This assumption is also implicit in TOWNLEY AND BOADWAY'S [1988] analysis of the annuity 
market, and it is similar in spirit but, in the context of life annuities, less demanding than that applied by 
ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1976] and by ECKSTEIN, EICHENBAUM AND PELED [1985]. They model price 
and quantity competition, which requires that individuals are restricted to buy only one insurance contract 
(otherwise all individuals would buy the contract where the price per unit of insurance is lowest).  
In reality, excluding individuals from buying a mix of contract types requires a system of information 
exchange among insurance companies.    23
Let the two contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) be defined as follows:  
(i)  ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) is the most preferred individually fair contract for group H, therefore 
1 ˆ
H q  =  2 ˆ
H q  by Lemma 2, as α = 1 is assumed.  
(ii) ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition (6) for group L, by the 
property that high-risk individuals are indifferent between ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) 
and by  1
L q > 2
L q .  
 
The way how ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) are defined is illustrated in Figure 2. The straight 
lines ZP
i, i = H,L, represent the zero-profit conditions for group i = L,H with respective 
slope  2 1/
i π − . Note for (ii) that with logarithmic utility the indifference curves in (q1,q2)-
space are strictly convex with slope  22 1 /( )
i qq π − , as mentioned above. Therefore the 
indifference curve  ˆ H U  going through ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) has exactly two points of intersections 
with the zero-profit condition ZP
L for group L.  1
L q > 2
L q  uniquely defines the one below 
the 45°-line. 
 
Obviously, the definition of ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) implies that each produces zero-
profits, if chosen only by the respective risk-group i = L,H, and this is ensured for group 
H by the condition U
H( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) = U
H( 1
L q , 2
L q ), which means that the self-selection 
constraint (11) for this risk-group is fulfilled with equality. Moreover, it turns out that 
the self-selection (12) constraint for group L holds as well: It is evident from Figure 2   24
that low-risk individuals are better off with their separate contract ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) than with 
( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ). This gives us an intuition for the next Lemma. 
 
Figure 2  
The possibility of a separating equilibrium ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), ( 1
L q , 2










































Lemma 6: ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) fulfill the self-selection constraints (11) and (12).  
 
As a consequence, the contract set ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) is an eligible candidate for a 
separating equilibrium. Moreover, the next Proposition reveals that this contract set is 
indeed the only candidate for a separating equilibrium.  
   25
Proposition 2: If a separating equilibrium exists, it consists of the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) 
and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ).  
 
As an intuition for this result, note first that ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), the contract which, among all 
individually fair contracts (i.e. those on ZP
H), is most preferred by type-H individuals, 
must be part of the equilibrium: Any other contract on ZP
H is dominated by ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), 
and firms need not care whether type-L individuals might choose that contract, because 
this would only increase the profit. However, when offering a specific contract to group 
L, firms have to care that this contract is not chosen by the high-risk individuals, 
because then they would make a loss. This implies that the self-selection constraint (11) 
is essential: Among all contracts on ZP
L, only the one which provides maximum utility 
for group L, subject to the self-selection constraint (11), can be part of a separating 
equilibrium; this is ( 1
L q , 2
L q ). Note, in particular, that ( 1 ˆ
L q , 2 ˆ
L q ), i.e. the contract on ZP
L, 
which is most preferred by the L-type individuals, cannot be part of the equilibrium, 
because it would be preferred by type-H individuals to any contract on ZP
H.  
 
The properties of the separating equilibrium correspond to familiar findings for other 
models with asymmetric information: Individuals in the "best" group (in our case: the 
long-living individuals) can buy their "first-best" contract, while individuals in the other 
group can only buy a "distorted" contract, in order to keep the former away from buying 
the contract designed for the latter, i.e. to avoid pooling. In the present framework this 
means that the payout in the first retirement period is increased at the expense of the 
payout in the second retirement period, up to a ratio at which the long-living individuals   26
switch to purchase their separate contract. Indeed, with ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) the ratio  1
L q / 2
L q  is 
sufficiently high that they are not better off than with their most preferred separate 
contract ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), though the latter offers a lower overall return.  
 
It remains to show whether ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) indeed represent a separating 
equilibrium, that is whether any other contract can be offered, which is preferred by at 
least one group and allows a non-negative profit. One notes first that the arguments 
which proved that no other pair of contracts constitutes a separating equilibrium also 
imply that no other separate contracts can be offered which are more favourable for the 
respective risk-types and produce nonnegative profits. However, ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) 
do not constitute an equilibrium either, if there exists a pooling contract that allows a 
non-negative profit and is preferred by both groups i = L,H.  
 
This argument is demonstrated graphically by means of Figure 2. Consider some 
pooling contract that lies above the indifference curves  ˆ H U  and 
L U , but on or below 
the dashed line ZP, which indicates the zero-profit condition (9) for pooling-contracts. 
(Note that in case of logarithmic utility, ZP is indeed a straight line, since annuity 
demand A
i and thus ρ do not depend on (q1,q2)). Obviously, any such pooling contract, 
e.g. ( 12 , qq  ), dominates ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) and produces a non-negative profit. Hence, 
no separating equilibrium exists. However, the existence of such a pooling contract is 
less likely, the higher the share γ of type-H individuals, because for a higher γ the zero-
profit line ZP in Figure 2 simply shifts to the left. If it does not cross 
L U , no 
dominating pooling contract exists. This gives us an intuition for   27
 
Proposition 3: There exists a critical value γ* > 0 of the share of group H such that for 
any given 
i
t π , t = 1,2, i = L,H, and any γ > γ* a separating equilibrium exists.  
 
We provide numerical examples for the existence and for the non-existence of a 
separating equilibrium in Appendix A.3. These calculations show, in addition, that 
whether or not a separating equilibrium exists, also depends on the difference between 
the survival probabilities  2
i π  of both groups i = L,H in the second retirement period. The 
existence of a separating equilibrium is more likely, the larger this difference.  
 
Finally note that the qualitative results throughout this section would not change when 
we assume a discount factor α < 1: In this case, for logarithmic utility the slope of the 
indifference curves is  22 1 /( )
i qq απ −  and the most preferred individually fair contract for 
both risk-groups is the one with  12
ii qq α =  (apply (7) for logarithmic utility). 
Consequently, ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1 ˆ
L q , 2 ˆ
L q ) lie on a straight line through the origin with slope 
α < 1 instead of α = 1 (see Figure 2). One observes immediately that the arguments for 
the characterization and the existence of a separating equilibrium remain valid.  
 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the basic arguments remain valid in case of a 
general per-period utility function, not just for a logarithmic one, as long as the single-
crossing condition holds. It is straightforward to see that the lines ZP
L and ZP
H, defined 
by the respective zero-profit conditions for the separate contract for each risk-group, are 
unaffected by the type of the utility function. Hence the characterization of the   28
separating equilibrium remains valid. The main difference is that with a general utility 
function the dashed curve ZP, defined by the zero-profit condition for pooling contracts, 
will no longer be a straight line, because annuity demand, and the demand ratio ρ in 
particular, depend on the payoff rates. The shape of ZP in turn has an influence on the 
existence of the equilibrium.  
 
3.3 The Wilson equilibrium 
 
In Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 we have analyzed the existence of Nash-Cournot equilibria. 
These are defined on the basic assumption that firms, when offering a new contract, take 
the other firms' contract offers as given. Unfortunately, as we have seen, parameter 
constellations are possible where no such equilibrium exists. Obviously, the question 
arises if something more can be said in that case. In the literature (WILSON [1977], 
RILEY [1979], HELLWIG [1987]) it is argued that such an unsatisfactory result is the 
consequence of an incomplete specification of the model (see also MAS-COLELL ET AL. 
[1995]). In particular, it is the missing consideration of reactions to new contract offers, 
which is held responsible for the non-existence of an equilibrium.  
 
Following this argument, an interesting approach was suggested by WILSON [1977]: Let 
a set of existing contracts be offered. A firm, considering a new contract offer, beliefs 
that existing contracts are not offered any more, if they become unprofitable due to the 
new contract offer. As a consequence, potential buyers of the existing contracts will turn 
to the new offer, which influences profitability of the latter. Accordingly, a Wilson 
pooling equilibrium (q1,q2) has to fulfill the property that no other contract exists which   29
is preferred by at least one group i = L,H and allows a nonnegative profit, given that 
(q1,q2) is withdrawn if it becomes unprofitable. The analogous qualification has to be 
added to the definition of the separating equilibrium in order to describe a Wilson 
separating equilibrium.  
 
One observes immediately that this qualification makes the definition less restrictive 
(new contract offers are less attractive). As a consequence, any Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium is also a Wilson equilibrium. Moreover, we have in case of logarithmic 
utility (13): 
 
Proposition 4: A Wilson equilibrium exists, even if the separating equilibrium does not 
exist. It is then a pooling equilibrium, denoted by ( 12 , qq  ), with the following 
properties: 
(i)   The zero-profit condition (9) is fulfilled. 
(ii)  ( 12 , qq  ) is the most preferred pooling contract for the type-L individuals. 
 
Intuitively, the arguments for the non-existence of a Nash-Cournot pooling equilibrium, 
as explored in Section 3.1, do not apply. The reason is that given ( 12 , qq  ), as defined in 
Proposition 4 (see also Figure 2), a "new" contract, which is preferred by the low-risk 
individuals only, turns out to be unprofitable and will not be offered according to 
Wilson's approach: It would be purchased also by the high-risk individuals due to the 
withdrawal of ( 12 , qq  ), which, if purchased only by the high-risk group, would cause 
negative profits.  
   30
Thus, we have found a potential answer to the question of what will be the outcome in 
case that parameters are such that no separating equilibrium according to the Nash-
Cournot assumption exists. (Note, as already mentioned, that the separating equilibrium, 
if it exists, is also the Wilson equilibrium.)
7 Numerical examples for a Wilson pooling 
equilibrium are provided in Appendix A.3. The arguments given at the end of Section 
3.2 apply for this section as well: They indicate that the result concerning the Wilson 
equilibrium remains valid also for a general utility function (not just for logarithmic), as 
long as the single-crossing condition holds.  
 
3.4. Equilibria with saving in bonds 
 
In this section we introduce the possibility of holding one-period bonds and study the 
implications for the existence of an equilibrium. First we note that, under the 
assumption of competitive firms, the returns from annuities are necessarily greater than 
those from bonds, i.e.  12 1 qq +>  (where 1 is the return from bonds for a zero interest 
rate).
8 Therefore an individual, who derives no utility from leaving a bequest, always 
decides to buy some annuities. However, if the ratio q1/q2 of annuity payoffs is 
inadequate, it is optimal for an individual to supplement annuities by bonds in order to 
smooth consumption appropriately over both retirement periods. If the relative payoff 
                                                  
7 H ELLWIG [1987] discusses how these concepts of an equilibrium are related to the modeling to 
the sequence of moves in the underlying multi-stage game.  
8  The result, which goes back to YAARI [1965], holds equivalently for a positive interest rate, 
because this increases the payoffs q1,q2 as well: Like the individuals, insurance companies invest the 
proceeds (premiums) in bonds and earn interest, until the premiums are paid back to the annuitants.  
The general intuition, why annuities offer a higher return than bonds, is the following: In case that an 
individual provides for old-age consumption through bonds, she leaves unintended bequests if dying 
prematurely. In this case, the deceased’s wealth is distributed to the heirs. If, in contrast, the individual 
puts her wealth into life annuities and dies prematurely, this unconsumed wealth is distributed as annuity   31
q1/q2 is sufficiently low, it is optimal for the individual in the working period to 
substitute annuities partly by bonds to increase consumption in the first retirement 
period. On the other hand, for a sufficiently high relative payoff q1/q2, it is optimal for 
the individual to put money aside from the payoff q1A
i in the first retirement period for 
the second retirement period. For payoff ratios q1/q2 in between, the optimal strategy for 
an individual is to buy annuities only.
9, 10  
 
Our analysis of possible equilibria proceeds along the same lines as before. Obviously, 
one can still draw indifference curves in the (q1,q2)-space, when holding bonds is 
included. It is straightforward to see that indifference curves are now flatter at points 
where holding bonds in period 0 actually occurs, because individuals have an additional 
instrument to adapt to a small decrease in q1, and thus need a smaller increase in q2 
(compared to a situation where bonds are excluded) in order to stay indifferent. By the 
same reasoning, the indifference curves are steeper at combinations of (q1,q2) where 
saving in bonds in period 1 occurs, compared to a situation where saving in bonds is 
excluded (because individuals need a smaller increase in q1 to compensate for a 
decrease in q2.) For intermediate ratios, where no bonds are held, indifference curves 
obviously are as in the model without bonds.  
                                                                                                                                            
payouts to the surviving annuitants. This result holds as long as an annuity company does not have the 
market power to collect all of the consumer surplus generated in the annuity market.  
9   As it is usual, we exclude that individuals can borrow on the capital market, due to the mortality 
risk. 
10   Formal arguments for these properties are provided in Appendix A.2.   32
Figure 3 










The important observation, relevant for the existence of a (separating) equilibrium is 
that for large enough q1/q2-ratios, such that saving and buying bonds in the first 
retirement period occurs, indifference curves become straight lines with slope –1. This 
is proved in Appendix A.2, but can intuitively be explained by the observation that an 
individual's utility does not change, if q1 is increased by  q ∆  and q2 is decreased by the 
same  q ∆ , because she can fully compensate this change by buying the same amount A
i 
as before and by saving 
i qA ∆  in period 1 and shifting this amount to the second 
retirement period: q1 and q2 are perfect substitutes. Since this applies to any individual, 
irrespective of her type, i.e. her survival probability, the indifference curves will 
coincide for sufficiently high payoff ratios. Thus, a situation prevails as shown in Figure 
3: Indifference curves coincide for large payoff ratios; the ratio at which type-H 
individuals start holding bonds is lower than the corresponding one for type-L 
individuals. This conforms with intuition: Long-living individuals will "sooner" be   33
prepared to provide for the second period of retirement by own saving out of first-
period annuity payouts.   
 
By similar arguments, we find that for sufficiently small q1/q2-ratios the indifference 
curves of both risk-types coincide (with slope  21 (1 ) qq −− ; see Appendix A.2) and that, 
if the q1/q2-ratio is increased, type-H individuals stop at a smaller ratio to supplement 
annuities by bonds in the working period than the type-L individuals (who have a 
smaller probability to survive to the second retirement period, hence for them the 




How does holding bonds affect the existence and characterization of the equilibria? In 
the following it will be shown that the main results do not change. First, we argue that 
the negative result concerning the existence of a pooling equilibrium maintains: For any 
zero-profit pooling contract (q1,q2) with intermediate ratio q1/q2, such that one or both 
risk-groups invest solely in annuities, we assume, as before, that the single-crossing 
condition holds,
12 therefore the arguments of Proposition 1 apply. For any zero-profit 
pooling contract (q1,q2), for which the indifference curves of both risk types coincide, 
i.e. for which both risk-groups hold bonds (either in period 0 or 1), unintended bequests 
are left by those who die prematurely. It is obvious that in this case one can find another 
                                                  
11   For small q1/q2-ratios, where individuals want to shift part of annuity payoffs from period 2 to 
period 1, the payoffs q2 and q1 are not one-to-one substitutes, because individuals cannot borrow on the 
capital market in period 1; thus shifting involves buying more bonds and less annuities in period 0. Still, 
indifference curves are straight lines, as is shown in Appendix A.2.  
12  This is fulfilled for any utility function which exhibits a constant coefficient of relative risk 
aversion.   34
pooling contract which makes both groups better off (by avoiding bequests) and allows 
non-negative profits. Consequently, no pooling equilibrium exists. 
 
Next we investigate the implications of holding bonds on the existence of a separating 
equilibrium. Again we find the result that a separating equilibrium may, but need not 
exist, by referring to logarithmic utility and assuming that the discount factor α equals 
one: We can replicate Figure 2 for the case that individuals are free to buy bonds (see 
Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 
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Note that for logarithmic utility the indifference curves of group i are convex with slope 
21 (1 ) qq −−  for any  12 1/(1 )
i q π ≤+, slope  22 1 /( )
i qq π −  for any  21 2 2 1/(1 ) /
ii qq π π +< <  
and slope –1 for any  12 2 /
i qq π ≥  (see Appendix A.2). The two contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and 
( 1
L q , 2
L q ), which may represent a represent a separating equilibrium, are defined as in 
Section 3.2. At their most preferred individually fair contract ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), it is never 
attractive for high-risk individuals to save in the first retirement period, as shown in 
Appendix A.2. But this may be the case for low-risk individuals, in case that ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) is 
offered to them: The ratio  12
LL qq  may be large enough that buying bonds in the first 
period of retirement is optimal. Such a situation is drawn in Figure 4. In this case the 
arguments explored in Section 3.2 for the model without saving apply: It depends on the 
position of the zero-profit line for a pooling contract whether or not ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and 
( 1
L q , 2
L q ) constitute a separating equilibrium, because both may be dominated by 
( 12 , qq  ), as drawn in Figure 4. 
 
Note, however, that there can be situations where no contract ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) with  1
L q > 2
L q  
exists, which lies on the zero-profit line ZP
L for group L and leaves the high-risk 
individuals indifferent to ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ). Then any individually fair contract for group L with 
1
L q > 2
L q  would make the high-risk individuals better off. Thus we have found a further 
reason for the non-existence of a separating equilibrium. Such a situation will prevail, if 
the zero-profit lines of group H and group L are sufficiently remote, which may be the 
case for a large difference in the survival probabilities of both groups.  
   36
Finally, it should be mentioned that the arguments for the existence of a Wilson 
equilibrium (given in Section 3.3) remain valid also in the model with holding bonds. 
Even if a separating equilibrium does not exist, the pooling contract ( 12 , qq  ), defined as 
in Proposition 4, constitutes a Wilson equilibrium. Again we give numerical examples 
for the existence of a separating equilibrium and for a Wilson pooling equilibrium in 
case of the non-existence of a separating equilibrium in the Appendix A.3.  
 
4   Concluding remarks 
 
Considering a life-cycle model with more than one period of retirement allows the 
formulation of an additional important aspect of the annuity market: It is an attractive 
strategy for companies to offer annuity contracts, for which the pension payoffs are not 
constant over the periods of retirement, since individuals with different life expectancies 
will put different weights on the payment they may or may not receive in the last period 
of life. In the present study we have analyzed the consequence of this possibility on the 
existence of equilibria in the private annuity market under price competition and 
asymmetric information. Our main finding was that in this framework a Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium may not exist; if one exists, it will be a separating equilibrium. On the other 




By assuming only one period of retirement, previous studies have neglected the fact that 
the time structure of the payoffs matters, which has led to the conclusion that under 
price competition and adverse selection a pooling equilibrium always exists. So, when   37
concentrating on the fact that in real life annuities provide periodic payouts over the 
time of retirement, one can conclude that the existence of a stable outcome is less likely 
than it has been supposed so far.  
 
An interesting question is whether the existence of the equilibrium is affected by the 
introduction of a public pension system. Obviously, this depends on the size of the 
obligatory contribution rates. If it is sufficiently small, nothing changes. To find out the 
effects of larger rates, we ran numerical simulations (reported in Appendix A.3), where 
a funded system with a fixed contribution for every individual and constant payoffs 
(over time) according to the average life-expectancy of the population was added into 
the model of this paper. It turned out that the introduction of a public pension system 
did not destroy the existence of the separating equilibrium. Further, for a certain range 
of parameter values, a separating equilibrium emerged, even if it did not without the 
public pension system. In this case the public pension system can give rise to a Pareto-
improvement. 
 
A consequence of our extended model is that it should change the view guiding 
empirical studies. Usually, they start from the premise that the annuity market should 
ideally offer a pooling contract for all risks, and study the adverse-selection 
phenomenon by comparing life-expectancy of annuity purchasers with the average life-
expectancy of the population. By looking at a specific annuity contract, the magnitude 
of adverse selection is measured by the difference between the expected rate of return 
for the general population and the expected rate of return for the subpopulation of   38
annuitants.
13 Instead, our result suggests that a primary object of investigation should be 
the question of whether separating indeed occurs and to which extent. As already 
mentioned in the Introduction, there is empirical evidence for the UK that selection 
effects across different types of annuity contracts, characterized by different time paths 
of the payouts indeed exists (FINKELSTEIN AND POTERBA [2002, 2004]). 
 
Given the problem of asymmetric information, the selection of risks through an 
appropriate time-structure of the payoffs is only one alternative among various possible 
others. In principle, selection can occur across all the different types of annuity 
contracts that are offered. For instance, as discussed in the Introduction, the length of 
the period covered by term-insured contracts acts as a selection instrument (TOWNLEY 
AND  BOADWAY [1988]), as do other parameters like a guaranteed minimum payoff 
period (to the advantage of a beneficiary) or the age at which the annuity is purchased 
(FINKELSTEIN AND POTERBA [2002]). Obviously, the best method to overcome the 
adverse-selection problem would be for an insurance company to collect more 
information related to life-expectancy of the customers, e.g. some characteristics of the 
socio-economic status (as is well-known, a better status corresponds with longer life 
expectancy) or even a health test. In fact, FINKELSTEIN AND POTERBA [2002] report that 
a minority of firms in the UK offer a discount for smokers or for people living in a 
region with high mortality, but by far the majority collects only information about 
gender and age. However, one might expect firms to change their behaviour and 
develop additional instruments in the future. 
 
                                                  
13   See, e.g., FRIEDMAN AND WARSHAWSKY [1988, 1990], WALLISER [2000], MITCHELL ET AL. 
[1999].    39
Private annuity insurance is becoming more important, because of the expected decline 
of the replacement ratio offered by the public pension system in many countries. Our 
contribution adds to the set of studies expressing doubts on the adequate functioning of 
the annuity market. Clarifying this issue further, appears to be a prominent task for 




A.1. Proofs  
 
Proof of Lemma 1: We determine  /
ii
t A π ∂ ∂ , t =1,2, by implicit differentiation of the 
first-order condition for annuity demand,  / 0
ii UA ∂ ∂= , with respect to 
i
t π  as 
22 (/ ) (/ )
ii i ii i
t UA UA A π −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . Since the denominator is negative due to the second-
order condition of the maximization problem, and the numerator for t = 1,2, is (use (1) –




11 1 2 2 2 /' ( ) ' ( )
ii i i i i U A qu qA qu qA πα π α ∂∂ ∂ = + ,  
(A1b) 
22
2122 /' ( )
ii ii i UA q u q A ππ α ∂∂ ∂ = ,  
 
which are both positive,  /
ii
t A π ∂∂ , t =1,2, are both positive too. Hence A
H > A
L.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: We maximize lifetime utility (4’) with respect to  1
i q  and  2
i q , subject 
to (6). Using (2) and (3), the first-order conditions of this problem are   40
 
(A2)  11 1 '( ) 0
ii i i Au c πα λ π += ,  
(A3) 
2
12 2 12 '( ) 0
ii i i ii Au c ππα λ ππ + = ,  
 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (6). From (A2) and 
(A3), we find that maximization requires (7). From (7) one concludes that  12
ii cc > , if 
α < 1, and  12
ii cc = , if α = 1. This in turn implies, together with (2) and (3), that for any 
arbitrarily given A
i,  12
ii qq > , if α < 1, and  12
ii qq = , if α = 1.   Q.E.D. 
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(A5) shows that the sign of  1
i Uq ∂∂  depends on the sign of  22 1 1
idq dq π + . Implicit 
differentiation of the zero-profit condition (9') gives  
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(A6) 
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Obviously, the assumption of a fixed ratio ρ of annuity demand implies  0 t q ρ ∂∂= , 
t =  1,2. Thus, for fixed ρ,  22 1
idq dq π  reduces to  21 1 1 2 12 () ( )
iL H L L H H π πρ π π πρ π π −+ + , 
which is smaller than –1 for i = H, and greater than –1 for i = L. As a consequence, the 
RHS in (A5) is negative for i = H and positive for i = L, which proves the Lemma.    
   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4:  1 /
i dA dq  is determined by implicit differentiation of the first-order 
condition for annuity demand,  /0


















Since the denominator of the RHS of (A7) is negative due to the second-order condition 
of the maximization problem,  1 /
i dA dq  has the same sign as the numerator of the RHS 
of (A7).  
 
Substituting (1), (2) and (3) into (4') we obtain  
 
(A8)  () ()
2
2 2
11 1 1 1 2 2 22
11
() () () ()
i
iii i i i i i i
i
dq U
uc q A uc uc qA uc
Aq d q
πα ππα
∂ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ =++ +
∂∂
.    42
 
If  12
ii cc =  (in case of α = 1) or if R is independent of 
i





















If  R =  1, then (A9) and thus (A7) are zero for individuals of both types i = L,H. 
Otherwise we determine, as in the proof of Lemma 3,  21 / dq dq  from the zero-profit 
condition (9') and find that for a fixed ratio ρ of annuity demand  2211
H dq dq π <−  and 
22 1 1
L dq dq π >− . Thus, in case that R < 1, (A9) is negative for i = H and positive for 
i = L. The opposite is true for R > 1.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5: As  11 21 2 10
LL L qq ππ π −− >  for any pooling contract (q1,q2), which 
fulfills the zero-profit condition (9), the profit for an insurance company is positive, 
given that only this group chooses the contract (q1,q2). By continuity, this holds for any 
contract ( 11 22 , qq qq δ δ ++ ) in the neighbourhood of (q1,q2).   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Let some contract (q1,q2) with associated A
i(q1,q2), i = L,H, be 
given, such that the zero-profit condition (9) is fulfilled. We find the effect 
i U δ  of a 
marginal change  12 (, ) qq δ δ  of the contract on group i's utility as 
 
(A10) 









,  i = L,H,    43
 
The single-crossing condition implies that the RHS's of the two equations (A10) are 
linearly independent (i.e. there is no k such that 
L U ∂ / 11 /
H qk U q ∂ =∂ ∂ and 
L U ∂ / 22 /
H qk U q ∂= ∂ ∂), hence the two equations (A10) have a unique solution. 
Choosing some  0
L U δ > ,0
H U δ <  and solving (A10) for  12 , qq δ δ , one finds a new 
contract ( 11 22 , qq qq δ δ ++ ), which is preferred by group L, but not by group H. By 
Lemma 5, it also allows a non-negative profit. (As 
L U δ  and 
H U δ  can be chosen 
arbitrarily close to zero,  1 q δ  and  2 q δ  can be taken as arbitrarily close to zero as well.) 
Hence (q1,q2) is not a pooling equilibrium.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 6: (11) is fulfilled by definition. That (12) is satisfied follows from 
1
L q >  2
L q , from the fact that ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) are on the same indifference curve 
for a type-H individual and that the slope of the indifference curve through ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) is 
steeper for a type-L individual than for a type-H individual (see Figure 2).   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Note first that, if ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) is part of the separating equilibrium, 
then ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) must be the other part, because it provides maximum utility for group L, 
subject to the self-selection constraint (11) for group H and to the zero-profit condition 
for (6) for i = L. With ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) and ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), (11) is fulfilled with equality. (Note from 
Figure 2 that the second point of intersection of  ˆ H U  and ZP
L, as mentioned in the text, 
as well as all contracts on ZP
L above this point of intersection, and also those below 
( 1
L q , 2
L q ), fulfill (11). However, they all provide lower utility for group L; remember the   44
single-crossing property.) Furthermore, one observes that, for the same reason, if any 
other contract ( 1 ′
H q , 2 ′
H q ) on ZP
H is part of a separating equilibrium, then the other part, 
the separate contract for group L, must be that pair of payoffs ( 1 ′
L q , 2 ′
L q ), which are 
found as the point of intersection of ZP
L and the indifference curve of group H through 
( 1 ′
H q , 2 ′
H q ), where  1 ′
L q > 2 ′
L q . Obviously, group H prefers ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) to any other 
( 1 ′
H q , 2 ′
H q ) and group L prefers ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) to any other ( 1 ′
L q , 2 ′
L q ). Q.E.D.   
 
Proof of Proposition 3: As mentioned in the text, a variation of the group share γ only 
influences the zero-profit condition (9) for a pooling contract, while leaving the zero-
profit condition (6) for separating contracts (and the indifference curves, of course) 
unchanged. Comparison of (9) and (6) shows that the zero-profit condition (9) for a 
pooling contract converges to the zero-profit condition (6) for group H, if γ approaches 
one. We have already seen that group L prefers ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) to any contract on ZP
H (note 
the single-crossing condition). By continuity, group L prefers ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) to any contract 
fulfilling the zero-profit condition for a pooling contract, as long as γ is sufficiently 
close to 1. In that case, no pooling contract can make a non-negative profit, because it is 
chosen only by the high-risk individuals. We define γ* as the infinum of all γ, for which 
group  L prefers ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) to any pooling contract. On the other hand, analogous 
considerations show that for sufficiently small γ, a profitable pooling contract, which 
dominates ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and ( 1
L q , 2
L q ), always exists.   Q.E.D.  
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Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is derived from geometric arguments (see Figure 2). 
Consider the pooling contract ( 12 , qq  ). We show that no firm has an incentive to deviate 
from ( 12 , qq  ): In case that a contract ( 11 qq δ +  , 22 qq δ +  ) is offered which is preferred by 
the low-risk, but not by the high-risk individuals (compare Figure 1), the original 
contract ( 12 , qq  ), being then purchased by the high-risk individuals only, makes 
negative profits and will be withdrawn from the market. Consequently, the type-H 
individuals will also accept the contract ( 11 qq δ +  ,  22 qq δ +  ), which therefore will turn 
out to be unprofitable (note that ( 11 qq δ +  ,  22 qq δ +  ), if preferred by the low-risk 
individuals, must lie to the right of the zero-profit line ZP for pooling contracts) and 
will not be offered. As a result, ( 12 , qq  ) is a Wilson pooling equilibrium.   Q.E.D. 
 
A.2 The decision problem in the model with saving in bonds 
In case that an individual i is free to buy annuities and one-period bonds, the budget 




ii i cw A K =− − ,  
(A12)  11
ii i i cq AKS = +− ,  
(A13)  22
ii i cq A S =+ ,  
 
where K
i denotes savings in bonds in the working period and S
i savings in bonds in the 
first retirement period. As mentioned in the main text, we exclude borrowing, hence 
,0
ii KS≥ . Substituting (A11) - (A13) into (4') and differentiating with respect to A
i, K
i,   46
and S
i, we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this maximization problem as (5) in the 
main text and additionally   
 
(A14)  0
i A =  and 
2
11 1 1 2 2 2 () () ()0 ′′ ′ −+ + ≤
ii ii i i
o uc q uc q uc πα ππα  
(A15) 0
i K >  and  01 1 () ()0 ′′ −+ =
ii i uc uc πα ,  
(A16) 0
i K =  and  01 1 () ()0 ′′ −+ ≤
ii i uc uc πα .  
(A17)  0
i S >  and 
2
11 1 2 2 () () 0 ′′ −+ =
ii i i i uc uc πα ππα ,  
(A18) 0
i S =  and 
2
11 1 2 2 () () 0 ′′ −+ ≤
ii i i i uc uc πα ππα .  
 
Note first that the conditions (5), (A15) and (A17) for the interior optima do not hold 
simultaneously, given that  12 1 qq +>  (as argued in Section 3.4): Substituting (A15) and 
(A17) into (5) yields  12 1 1 (1 ) ( ) 0 ′ −+ + =
ii qq u c πα , which is only fulfilled if  12 1 qq += . 
(In this case, the individuals would be indifferent between savings in bonds and 
annuities to provide for retirement, because annuities and bonds yield the same returns.) 
Moreover, the case that  0
i A =  can be excluded: Then  0
i K >  and  0
i S >  must hold to 
ensure positive consumption levels in both retirement periods. Using (A14), (A15) and 
(A17) yields  12 1 1 (1 ) ' ( ) 0
ii qq u c πα −+ + ≤ , which is fulfilled only if  12 1 qq + < .  
 
Hence, the cases A
i > 0 and either K
i >  0 or S
i > 0 (but not both) or K
i = S
i = 0 remain, 
where obviously K
i > 0 occurs for sufficiently small payoff ratios  12 qq  and S
i > 0 
occurs for sufficiently large payoff ratios  12 qq . One can show by (a bit tedious) 
implicit differentiation of (5) and (A15) that for small  12 qq , such that K
i > 0,  K
i   47
decreases along an indifference curve in the (q1,q2)-space with increasing  12 qq -ratio, 
while implicit differentiation of (5) and (A17) shows that for large  12 qq , such that 
S
i > 0,  S
i increases along an indifference curve. Hence, as not both are positive 
simultaneously, K
i and S
i are zero for intermediate values of  12 qq . Specifically we 
show that it is optimal for an individual to choose A
i > 0, K
i = 0 and S
i = 0 at her most 
preferred individually fair contract (q1,q2) determined by (7): Substituting (7) into the 
condition (A18) for the boundary optimum S
i = 0 yields 
 
(A19)  21 1 (1 ) ( ) 0 ′ − +≤
ii i uq A ππ α .  
 
which is strictly fulfilled, as  2 1
i π < . By use of condition (5) for the interior optimum 
A
i > 0 and of the condition (A16) for the boundary optimum K




11 1 1 2 2 2 (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0 ′′ − ++ ≥
ii i i i q u qA qu qA πα ππα .  
 
Substituting (7) and the zero-profit condition (6) into (A20) gives 
 
(A21)  11 (1 ) ' ( ) 0 − +≥
ii uq A πα ,  
 
which is strictly fulfilled, as  1 1 <
i π .  
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Remember from Section 3.1 that the slope ( ) ( ) 12 //
ii Uq Uq −∂∂ ∂∂  of an indifference 
curve in the (q1,q2)-space is just given by  ( ) 12 2 '( ) '( )
















    
 
shows that the slope is equal to –1 for those  12 qq -ratios, at which S
i > 0. Equivalently, 









uq A K q




    
 
that the slope of the indifference curve is equal to  21 (1 ) qq −−  for those  12 qq -ratios, 
at which K
i > 0.  
 
Moreover, if we start from some pair (0,
0
2 q ) – where only the second-period payoff is 
positive, and with associated optimal values  0 0
i K >  and  0 0
i A > , then unchanged 
consumption in all three periods, given an increase in q1, requires that new values  1
i K , 
1
i A  and  2 q  fulfil  00 11
ii ii KAKA +=+,  01 1 1
ii i KKq A =+ , 
0
20 21
ii qA qA = . Solving this system 
gives 
0
22 1 (1 ) qq q =− , that is, indifference curves are straight lines with slope 
0
22 1 (1 ) qq q −= − − , as long as K
i is positive.  
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Finally, for logarithmic utility (see (13)) we obtain, by use of (A18), that S
i = 0  if 
12 2 ()
i qqπ α ≤  and, by use of (A20), that K
i = 0 if  12 1( 1 )
i q π α ≥+ . From this and the 
considerations above it follows that for logarithmic utility the indifference curves of 
group i are convex with slope  21 (1 ) qq −−  for any  12 1/(1 )
i q π α <+ , slope  22 1 /( )
i qq π −  
for any  21 2 2 1/(1 ) /( )
ii qq π απ α +≤ ≤  and slope –1 for any  12 2 /( )
i qq π α > . 
 
A.3 Numerical illustration of the (non-)existence of separating equilibria.  
 
(a) Model without Saving in Bonds: For logarithmic utility (see (13)), annuity demand is 

















which is independent from the rates of return (q1,q2), as mentioned in the text. 
 
The separate contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and  12 (,)
LL qq are computed as follows: Solving the 
zero- profit condition (6) for i = H and setting  1
H q =  2
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The contract  12 (,)
LL qq for type-L individual, is determined by the self-selection 
constraint (11), and the zero-profit-condition (6) for i = L. Assuming equality, one 
derives from (11) (making use of (A24), (A25), (2), (3) and (13)) 
 
(A26)  () () ()














(A26) can be solved to compute  1
L q , then  2
L q  follows from (6).  
 
In order to proof that the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and  12 (,)
LL qq indeed constitute an 
equilibrium, we have to show that there is no pooling contract which fulfills the zero-
profit condition (9') and is preferred by individuals of both types i = L,H. To do so, we 
concentrate on the pooling contract ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) which together with (A24) fulfils the zero-
profit condition (9') and which is preferred most by a type-L individual. This is the 
accurate procedure, since an individual of type H is certainly better off with the pooling 
contract ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) than with her own contract ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), given a type-L individual prefers 
( 1 q  , 2 q  ) to  12 (,)
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where ( )/((1 ) )
H L AA ργ γ =− . Thus, whenever the low-risk individuals are worse off at 
( 1 q  , 2 q  ), the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and  12 (,)
LL qq constitute an equilibrium. Otherwise they   51
do not and the contract ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) is the pooling equilibrium according to the definition of 
Wilson. 
 
In Table 1 we provide numerical examples, for which annuity demand A
i, the contracts 
( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ),  12 (,)
LL qq and ( 1 q  , 2 q  ), as well as expected utility U
i of individuals of both 
types i = H,L, at these contracts are calculated explicitly. We choose three different 
scenarios, which differ in the share γ of the high risk individuals (scenarios 1 and 2) and 
in the survival probability  2
L π  of the type-L individuals in period 2 (scenarios 1 and 3). 
In scenario 1 the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and  12 (,)
LL qq constitute an equilibrium. Taking this 
as a reference point, we show that a lower share γ of type-H individuals (scenario 2) and 
a higher survival probability  2
L π  of the type-L individuals to period 2 (scenario 3) entail 
that there is no separating equilibrium in a competitive annuity market. In both of these 
scenarios ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) constitutes the Wilson pooling equilibrium. 
 
(b) Model with Saving in Bonds: For logarithmic utility (see (13)), we calculate demand 
for annuities and bonds in the first retirement period by use of the first-order conditions 
(5), (A17), (A18) and (A16), together with the budget constraints (A11) – (A13). For 
12 1( 1 )
i q π ≥+ (that is, K
i = 0; see Appendix A.2) we obtain again (A24) for annuity 
demand and  
 
(A28) 























> ⎪ ++ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ≤
⎪ ⎩
    52
 
for savings in bonds in the first retirement period.  
 
The separate contract ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) for type H is given by (A25). The separate contract 
12 (,)
LL qq for type L is determined by the self-selection constraint (11), and the zero-
profit-condition (6) for i = L. Assuming equality, one derives from (11) (making use of 
(A24), (A25), (A28), (13), (A17) and (A18)) 
 
(A29)  S
















































H = 0 and (A26). 
 
Again we determine the pooling contract ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) which fulfills the zero-profit 
condition (9') and is preferred most by a type-L individual. At ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) the individual of 
type L does not buy bonds in period 0 nor in period 1, as can be seen as follows: For any 
12 2 1( 1 ) 1( 1 )
LH q π π ≥+>+, the slope (A6) of the zero-profit condition is 
11 1 21 2 () ( ) 1
LH L LH H πρ π π πρ π π −+ + < − , as  0 t q ρ ∂ ∂=  by use of (A24). However, at 
points, where S
L > 0, the indifference curves of a type-L individual have slope −1, and 
are, thus, flatter. On the other hand, at  12 1( 1 )
L q π =+ with the corresponding q2 such 
that the zero-profit condition (9') is fulfilled, the slope of the indifference curve is 
22 1 /( )
L qq π − . It is steeper than the slope of the zero-profit condition 
11 1 21 2 () ( )
LH L LH H π ρπ π π ρπ π −+ + , as follows immediately, if  12 1( 1 )
L q π =+ and the zero-
profit condition (9') are substituted into  22 1 /( )
L qq π − . Hence, the (convex) indifference   53
curves of a type-L individual can only be tangent to the zero-profit condition, where 
S
L = 0 and where  12 1( 1 )
L q π >+, i.e. where K
L = 0. As a consequence, ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) is given 
by (A27). 
 
In Table 1 numerical examples for equilibria in the model with old-age saving are 
given, where the same parameter constellations (Scenario 1 – 3) are chosen as for the 
model without saving. Besides the respective values of the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ),  12 (,)
LL qq 
and ( 1 q  , 2 q  ), annuity demand A
i and indirect utility U
i, savings S
i of both types at these 
contracts are included in the Table. As in the model without saving we find that in 
scenario 1 the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and  12 (,)
LL qq constitute an equilibrium, while in 
scenario 2 (with a lower share γ of type-H individuals) and scenario 3 (a higher survival 
probability  2
L π  of the type-L individuals) no separating equilibrium exists. In the latter 
two scenarios ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) constitute the Wilson pooling equilibrium.  
 
(c) Model with mandatory actuarially fair public pension system: In Table 2 we provide 
numerical computations to illustrate whether the existence of the equilibrium is affected 
by a mandatory fully-funded public pension system. To do so, we take the computations 
in Table 1 as a reference point. Thus, we consider the same three scenarios as in Table 
1, however now we assume that each individual has to pay contributions T to a public 
pension system, which offers constant actuarially fair pension benefits according to the 
average life-expectancy of the population. Thus the budget equations in the three 
periods read 
   54
(A30)  0
ii cw A T =− −,  
(A31)  11
ii cq Ab T =+ ,  
(A32)  22
ii cq A b T =+ ,  
 
where b denotes the actuarially fair benefit rate offered per unit of pension contribution 
T in each period of retirement t = 1,2, with 
 
(A33) 
11 2 1 1 2
1
(1 )( ) ( )
LL L HH H b






i,  i = L,H, in the presence of a public pension system is then 
determined by the first-order condition (5), together with the budget constraints (A30) – 


















(A34) makes obvious that annuity demand A
i depends on the annuity payoffs q1 and q2, 
which is in contrast to the findings in the model without a public pension system. 
Consequently, apart from the separate contract ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) for type H, which is again 
given by (A25), the separate contract  12 (,)
LL qq for type L as well as the pooling contract 
( 1 q  , 2 q  ) can be computed only numerically. The separate contract  12 (,)
LL qq for type L is   55
determined by the zero-profit-condition (6) for i = L, by the self-selection constraint 
(11) and by use of (A25), (A31) – (A34) and (13) for i = H. As in the model without a 
public pension system, the pooling contract ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) is the one which maximises utility 
(13) for i = L and fulfils, together with (A34) for i = L,H, the zero-profit condition (9').  
 
For each scenario we vary the contributions T to public pensions system (5 %, 15 % and 
25 % of the labour income w) and plot the respective values of the contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), 
12 (,)
LL qq and ( 1 q  , 2 q  ), as well as annuity demand A
i and indirect utility U
i of both types 
i = L,H at these contracts and find the following results: In scenario 1, the introduction 
of the public pension system (irrespective of its size) does not change the result that the 
contracts ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ) and  12 (,)
LL qq constitute an equilibrium. On the other hand, in 
Scenario 2 (with a lower share γ of type-H individuals than in Scenario 1) the 
introduction of a mandatory public pension system changes the results: Now, a 
separating equilibrium exists (again for all three values of T), while it did not in the 
absence of public pension system. In this case, each type of individual i = L,H is better 
off at her separate contract  12 (,)
LL qqand ( 1 ˆ
H q , 2 ˆ
H q ), resp., than at the pooling contract 
( 1 q  , 2 q  ). The same result is found in Scenario 3 for the highest value of contributions to 
the public pension system (T = 250). However for lower values of T = 50, 150, no 
separating equilibrium exists, which corresponds to the result found in the model 
without a public pension system. In this case ( 1 q  , 2 q  ) constitute the Wilson pooling 
equilibrium.  
                                                                                                                                            
14  Note that for a sufficiently large public pension system annuity demand of an individual can be zero.    56
Table 1 
Numerical illustration of the (non-)existence of separating equilibria for log utility 
Scenario 1: Existence of a separating equilibrium ( 1
H ˆ q , 2
H ˆ q ), ( 1
L q , 2
L q ) 
 w = 1000, γ = 0.6,  1
H π = 0.8,  2
H π = 0.6,  1
L π = 0.7,  2
L π = 0.2.  
Model without Saving in Bonds:  
 A
H = 561.4,  
 A
L = 456.5. 
Model with Saving in Bonds:  
 A
H = 561.4, S
H = 350.9 (0.6q1 − q2),  
 A
L = 456.5,  S
L = 380.4 (0.2q1 − q2). 
contracts  U
H U






H ˆ q =0.781,  2
H ˆ q =0.781 
  1
L q =1.376,  2






H ˆ q =0.781,  2
H ˆ q =0.781 
  1
L q =1.407,  2









  1  q =1.090,  2  q =0.462 13.885 11.394    1  q =1.090,  2  q =0.462 13.902 11.394   67.1  0 
 
Scenario 2: Non-existence of a separating equilibrium, existence of a Wilson equilibrium ( 1  q , 2  q ) 
 w = 1000, γ = 0.2,  1
H π = 0.8,  2
H π = 0.6,  1
L π = 0.7,  2
L π = 0.2. 
Model without Saving in Bonds:  
 A
H = 561.4, 
 A
L = 456.5. 
Model with Saving in Bonds:  
 A
H = 561.4, S
H = 350.9 (0.6q1 − q2),  
 A
L = 456.5,  S
L = 380.4 (0.2q1 − q2). 
contracts  U
H U






H ˆ q =0.781,  2
H ˆ q =0.781 
  1
L q =1.376,  2






H ˆ q =0.781,  2
H ˆ q =0.781 
  1
L q =1.407,  2









  1  q =1.152,  2  q =0.758 14.166 11.502    1  q =1.152,  2  q =0.758 14.166 11.502  0  0 
 
Scenario 3: Non-existence of a separating equilibrium, existence of a Wilson equilibrium ( 1  q , 2  q ) 
 w = 1000, γ = 0.6,  1
H π = 0.8,  2
H π = 0.6,  1
L π = 0.7,  2
L π = 0.5. 
Model without Saving in Bonds:  
 A
H = 561.4, 
 A
L = 512.2. 
Model with Saving in Bonds:  
 A
H = 561.4, S
H = 350.9 (0.6q1 − q2), 
 A
L = 512.2,  S
L = 341.5 (0.5q1 − q2). 
contracts  U
H U






H ˆ q =0.781,  2
H ˆ q =0.781 
  1
L q =1.250,  2






H ˆ q =0.781,  2
H ˆ q =0.781 
  1
L q =1.343,  2









  1  q =0.875,  2  q =0.774 13.956 12.557    1  q =0.875,  2  q =0.774 13.956 12.557  0  0   57 
Table 2 
Numerical computations of the effects of a mandatory actuarially fair pension system on the (non-)existence of separating equilibria 
Scenario 1:  w = 1000, γ = 0.6,  1
H π = 0.8,  2
H π = 0.6,  1
L π = 0.7,  2
L π = 0.2,  b = 0.906 




































































1  q =1.113,   2  q =0.412 504.9 406.0 13.881  11.395  1  q =1.171,   2  q =0.287  385.6 306.0 13.885  11.398  1  q =1.241,   2  q =0.139 262.6  211.0  13.915  11.400 
 
Scenario 2:  w = 1000, γ = 0.2,  1
H π = 0.8,  2
H π = 0.6,  1
L π = 0.7,  2
L π = 0.2,  b = 1.078 




































































1  q =1.163,   2  q =0.717 508.4 406.0 14.163  11.503  1  q =1.196,   2  q =0.597  398.6 304.8 14.155  11.505  1  q =1.255,   2  q =0.396 278.7  203.8  14.149  11.508 
 
Scenario 3:   w = 1000, γ = 0.6,  1
H π = 0.8,  2
H π = 0.6,  1
L π = 0.7,  2
L π = 0.5,  b = 0.842 




































































1  q =0.879,   2  q =0.764 511.2 462.1 13.956  11.557  1  q =0.894,   2  q =0.735  410.4 361.7 13.955  12.557  1  q =0.928,   2  q =0.672 308.7  261.0  13.953  12.557   58
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